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PROPOSAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS FOR THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT:
A CRUCIAL STEP IN ESTABLISHING
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC STABILITY
IN PALESTINE AND A LASTING PEACE
I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between Israel and Palestine is one in which
both sides stubbornly believe that their own religion and histo-
ry has given them the right to the land. These deep-rooted
beliefs have created a conflict in which communication has
been thought of as unproductive. As a result, this conflict has
been traditionally settled by warfare and bloodshed and has
placed the focus in the region on preparedness for war. Israel
and the Palestinian territories (Palestine) are places where
everyone takes bomb drills seriously, where children frequently
abandon playgrounds to go into shelters, and where you can
feel the constant pressure of a dense stifling tension.
Since Israel came into existence in 1948, the Israelis and
the Palestinians have not had any successful discussions re-
garding a permanent solution to the conflict. However, with
the secret negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Yitzchak Rabin's administration, a
process towards peace began. The recognition by an Israeli
administration of the PLO as the representative of the Pales-
tinian people was a crucially important first step in this pro-
cess. By this recognition, the Rabin administration showed its
earnest desire to engage in serious negotiations. These negoti-
ations have, and still require, each side to learn to overcome
centuries of distrust while proving its own accountability. To
achieve a final peace it is essential that the parties establish a
peaceful means to address grievances so they do not resort to
their familiar battlegrounds for solving disputes.
This Note is a proposal to the Israeli government to sub-
mit disputes under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (Interim Agreement) to a
1. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
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dispute settlement mechanism. To maintain a fruitful atmo-
sphere of negotiations it is essential for the provisions of the
Interim Agreement to be binding. The creation of a binding
dispute settlement mechanism would increase economic stabili-
ty in the West Bank and Gaza and would, over time, decrease
Palestinian hostilities, thereby reducing Israeli security con-
cerns and ensuring a lasting peace. The importance of a stable
relationship between Israel and Palestine is unquestionable
and the failure of the current process will have negative rami-
fications for the entire region. This Note presupposes that the
success of an Israeli-Palestinian peace is intricately inter-
twined with Palestinian economic stability. Thus, in order to
further economic growth in Palestine, Israel needs to adopt
policies which would advance Palestine's efforts to develop its
own industries and attract foreign investment by fostering
confidence in the international financial community.
Economic growth in Palestine has been hindered mainly
by Israel's security concerns. Although these are valid con-
cerns, grounded in years of hostilities between the parties and
reinforced by continued terrorist attacks, they also may esca-
late rather than decrease hostilities. This Note advances the
proposition that the current hostilities are largely attributable
to the Palestinians' economic disadvantage. It is not surprising
that the economically disadvantaged, who have little control
over their economic future, would be hostile towards their
economically advantaged neighbors who are, in the case of
Israel and Palestine, living in such close proximity.
This Note focuses on reducing hostilities by submission to
dispute settlement in order to increase economic stability. It
does not discount the fact that Palestinian hostilities are root-
ed, to a certain degree, in the lack of Palestinian sovereignty
and aimed at the creation of a Palestinian state. Rather, it
advances the proposition that the current hostilities are a
mixture of unrest, due to the delay of the overall goal, and
anger due to economic disadvantage. Further, since the parties
Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O. (State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs print)
[hereinafter Interim Agreement]. The Interim Agreement provides for gradual with-
drawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It also provides a
framework for a Palestinian Authority to represent the population of the new
autonomous areas. The agreement also provides guidelines for security, economic
cooperation and a Liaison Committee. The provisions of the Interim Agreement
pertinent to this Note will be discussed in Part III.
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are working towards solving their conflict through peaceful
negotiations, it should be possible to reduce the hostilities by
initiating a binding dispute settlement mechanism, thereby
demonstrating to Palestinians that the Interim Agreement has
resulted in an increase in their sovereignty, albeit limited. As a
result, support for the fundamentalist Palestinian factions,
such as Hamas, who believe that the only means to gain com-
plete Palestinian statehood is by holy war, will decrease. More-
over, submission by Israel to a binding dispute resolution pan-
el would result in decisions being rendered by a neutral party
and therefore would increase, although to a limited degree,
Palestinian autonomy. This will increase foreign investment in
Palestine because the resulting increased political stability will
reduce the risks of doing business there.2 This increase in
investment will directly address Palestinian economic frustra-
tions. Thus, both sovereignty and economic concerns will be de-
creased by a binding dispute settlement mechanism.
The creation of a binding dispute resolution panel also is
needed because of Israel's constantly changing parliamentary
majority, as exemplified by the recent shift in majority from
the Labor Party to the Likud, which has increased concerns
about the stability of the already fragile Interim Agreement.
Moreover, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud's leader and
Israel's Prime Minister, has shaken Palestinian confidence in
the negotiation process by proposing unilateral changes to
some of the terms in the Interim Agreement and by delaying
implementation of some of the already agreed-upon steps.3
The frustrations of the Palestinian people with the current
government have been expressed by Hanan Ashrawi, Minister
of Higher Education of the Palestinian National Authority:
Where is the credibility of the state of Israel? We did not sign
an agreement with the Labor Party or with Meretz. We
signed an agreement with the state of Israel, witnessed by
2. See Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 77 (1992) (observing that "[firee trade inclines diplomacy to-
ward peace because international business transactions require stability and pre-
dictability to be successful").
3. Mr. Netanyahu has denounced the Interim Agreement since its inception.
See Benjamin Netanyahu, McCarthyism in Tel-Aviv, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at
A33 (clarifying Likud opposition to the Olso agreements); Ilene R. Prusher, U.S.
Drive in Mideast Hits Speed Bumps, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 21,
1997 (International), at 5.
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the co-sponsors and by the major powers, and by the Arab
countries. Now, these agreements are supposed to be binding.
Where is accountability, intervention, even arbitration? And
the peace process is left to be hostage entirely to this Israeli
government's policies and practices .... [There is increasing
alarm and serious, serious concern that this peace process is
rapidly getting nowhere, that Israel is unilaterally destroying
it, and therefore that all these plans at economic normaliza-
tion and joint ventures are not going to materialize, given the
political climate and the tremendous instability of the situa-
tion.4
If there was a binding dispute resolution mechanism, Mr.
Netanyahu would not be able to unilaterally change the Inter-
im Agreement and would have to submit proposed changes to a
panel in order to determine if they are consistent with the
current agreement. This panel would help insure that the
parties were taking steps towards furthering negotiations and
increasing Palestinian autonomy rather than perpetuating the
status of Palestine as an Israeli territory.
This Note focuses on the relationship between policy and
economic health, and discusses how an enforcement mecha-
nism would aid in developing long-term peace between Israel
and Palestine. Part H of this Note focuses on the general issue
of why countries willingly forgo some sovereignty power in ex-
change for economic stability. This section begins with a dis-
cussion of the problematic economic situation in Palestine and
provides examples of how Israeli policies are interfering with
Palestinian economic development. Additionally, this section
discusses comparative situations that show how increasing
economic stability could help decrease hostilities. This section
continues with an in-depth discussion of three multilateral
agreements that illustrate how the need for economic stability
has been the justification for a reduction in sovereignty. The
multilateral agreements discussed are: (1) the agreement es-
tablishing the European Economic Union and how its origins
lay in the mutual recognition among the European nations
that they must forge an economically dependent union in order
to'prevent the occurrence of another world war;5 (2) the North
4. Hanan Ashrawi, (address before the National Association of Arab Ameri-
cans, Oct. 17, 1996), reprinted in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, October 17, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
5. See Christopher J. Iamarino, Note, Technical Barriers to Trade Under the
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and (3) the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)7 including an
elaboration on why the GATT was unsuccessful without a
dispute resolution mechanism, which resulted in the contract-
ing parties' agreement to establish the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO).8 The discussion of the above agreements will be
bifurcated, commencing with a discussion of the motivations
for the reduction of sovereignty, and continuing with a discus-
sion of the agreed-upon enforcement mechanism. Part III dis-
cusses the existing agreement between Israel and Palestine
and will include a brief history of the events leading to the
Interim Agreement, as well as elements of the Interim Agree-
ment and current political conditions which are problematic.
Part IV incorporates the enforcement mechanisms previously
discussed, and provides suggestions for several possible en-
forcement frameworks for the Interim Agreement. These possi-
ble frameworks range from a dispute settlement panel with
limited jurisdiction over investment disputes, such as that
created in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
(ICSID),9 to a judicial body with jurisdiction over the entire
scope of the Interim Agreement. Finally, the conclusion propos-
es that, although Israel should submit to some form of dispute
settlement, it may be more practical for Israel to give up sover-
eignty powers gradually and in proportion with a demonstrat-
ed increase in Palestinian compliance with the Interim Agree-
ment.
NAFTA System: A Call For Legitimate Protection, 21 J. LEGIS. 111, 114 n.23
(1995).
6. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., art. 2022, 32 I.L.M. 296, 32 I.L.M. 605, 698 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT'I.
8. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRt-MENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
9. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [here-
inafter ICSID Convention].
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II. THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE
A. Israel and Palestine
The issue of sovereignty is central to the thesis that Israel
should submit to a dispute settlement mechanism because
essentially Israel would be giving up control over some of its
strategic security policies, and subjecting them to the possibili-
ty that they are in violation of the Interim Agreement. Thus,
Israel will be decreasing its control over the West Bank and
Gaza. It is essential, therefore, that the benefits received by
Israel from the reduction in its sovereignty outweigh its loss of
complete authority.
It is evident from the Israeli decision to pursue a peaceful
solution, which began by the acknowledgment of the PLO and
the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements (Declaration of Principles),0 that
Israel places great importance on the value of peaceful rela-
tions with its Palestinian neighbors. There was a recognition
by the Israeli government that the continuation of the status
quo regarding the territories was not solving the problem, that
the fundamentalist elements in the territories were gaining
support, and that the Intifada was resulting in international
sympathies for the Palestinians. Shimon Perez, Israel's former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote regarding the Intifada and
fundamentalism that:
[Pleople can acquire arms which are not as dangerous, such
as stones, or, maybe even eventually nuclear bombs. And we
should not be light-minded about it. The reason for their
belligerency is, as I have said, want, discrimination, and
starvation. Can you kill starvation with a rifle? Can you solve
the dangers of fundamentalism by bombing it from the
air?... Unless we go to the roots of the problems and try to
organize ourselves to answer them, we shall pay dearly and
heavily."
Additionally, the former minister captured both the motiva-
10. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on In-
terim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O., 32 I.L.M. 1525
[hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
11. Shimon Perez, A Better World, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281, 284
(1995).
560 [Vol. XXII:2
1997] DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 561
tions for pursuing peace, and gave direction to that pursuit
when he wrote:
We took food from the mouths of our children, prevented
young people from having a proper education, and instead
invested money in the metals of tanks and planes. Who will
pay for this folly... [But wie can change it. And that is what
we are now beginning to do by building a new economy in the
Middle East. The focus must be regional and the goals must
be economic, not strategic. 2
The parties' goal of attaining long-term peace is put forth
in the Preamble to the Interim Agreement where the parties
reaffirmed "their determination to put an end to decades of
confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual digni-
ty and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and
political rights."" Moreover, the recognition that this goal is
not achievable without economic stability in the region is made
evident by the inclusion of the Protocol on Economic Relations
between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO,
Representing the Palestinian People'4 (Economic Protocol).
The Economic Protocol, an integral part of the Interim Agree-
ment, states in its preamble that "[t]he two parties view the
economic domain as one of the cornerstone[s] in their mutual
relations with a view to enhance their interest in the
achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace." 5
It is therefore evident that Israel has recognized the im-
portance of economic development in Palestine and has taken
the initial steps to provide Palestinians with some autonomous
powers. However, this process has been fraught with violent
encounters from both sides." These clashes have supplied
12. Id. at 287. As Perez stated succinctly, "I believe that, without solving the
economic problems, we do not have a chance to enjoy a permanent peace." Id. at
286.
13. Interim Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
14. Protocol on Economic Relations between the, Government of the State of
Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian People, Interim Agreement,
supra note 1, Annex V, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 696 [hereinafter Economic Protocol].
15. Id. Preamble. The preamble continues to state that "[bloth parties shall
cooperate in this field to establish a sound economic base for these relations,
which will be governed in various economic spheres by principles of mutual re-
spect of each other's economic interests, reciprocity, equity and fairness." Id.
16. See Serge Schmemann, West Bank Strife Spreads as Israel Awaits U.S.
Mediator, N.Y. Tims, March 27, 1997, at A6 (describing recent eruptions of vio-
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those against the peace process with ammunition to attempt to
derail it. It is unwise for Israel to respond to these negative
forces by resorting to the familiar retaliation-in-the-name-of-
security response. This response just lengthens the inevitable
phase of resistance to the peace process. Rather, Israel should
remember the violence that existed before the initiation of the
peace process and be motivated to move forward to create a
lasting peace. The emphasis should not be on the need for
complete sovereignty, but rather on what could be gained as a
result of an exchange of some sovereignty power. As one au-
thor, Joel P. Trachtman, stated:
Sovereignty, viewed as an allocation of power and responsi-
bility, is never lost, but only reallocated. The attractiveness of
a reallocation of sovereignty should be measured by reference
to whether it allows social goals to be achieved more effec-
tively. Thus the question raised regarding the reallocation is
whether the recipient of enhanced power and responsibility
will exercise power and recognize its responsibility more
effectively .... [Ilt may be viewed as a question of what is
received, and by whom, in exchange for a reduction in the
state's sovereignty, rather than simply a question of whether
sovereignty is reduced. 1
In order to advance the argument that Israel will ultimately
benefit from an enforcement of the Interim Agreement it is
important, first, to gain an understanding of the current eco-
nomic situation in Palestine and, second, to establish how
hostility is intertwined with economic instability through an
analysis of comparative situations.
1. The Palestinian Economy
The West Bank and Gaza are crippled by severe economic
hardship, from rising unemployment to a lack of foreign invest-
ment. 8 The economic negotiator for the Palestinian Authority
(PA), Mohammed Shatyyeh, summarized the situation as fol-
lows:
lence between Palestinian protesters and Israeli soldiers).
17. Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty,
Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 400 (1994).
18. See David Harris, A Closed Economy, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 9, 1996, (Eco-
nomics), at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
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There is 38% unemployment of the workforce in the West
Bank, 51% in Gaza. Per capita income in the West Bank has
declined from $2,000 to $950 and in Gaza from $1,200 to
about $600. There has been a drop of about 25% in GDP
overall, a decline in foreign investment, a deficit increase.
Tax collection is also in a bad way. If there is no business,
there is no tax collection.19
It is impossible to discuss Palestine's economy in a vacuum
since many of its economic difficulties are directly attributable
to Israeli policies. After the many bus bombings in Israel in
late 1994 and early 1995, then Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin
instituted a policy of separation between the Israelis and Pal-
estinians which resulted in the Palestinian people being un-
able to enter Israel during periods of security closures. This
policy was continued by Prime Minister Shimon Perez in re-
sponse to the suicide bombings of early 1996. Shatyyeh ex-
plained that these Israeli border closures have been the main
reason for the slowdown of business activity.0 Although the
PA has been able to create about 68,000 jobs since 1994, it has
not been able to absorb the approximately 120,000 Palestinians
that have lost their jobs in Israel due to the border closures.21
The deterrent effect that the border closures have had on
foreign investment was emphasized by former U.S. Congress-
man Mel Levine, who described a South Carolina furniture
maker whose plans to do business in Gaza were frustrated:
[An] illustrative example involves a successful manufacturer
19. Id. (referring to economic changes occurring over a two-year period be-
tween 1994 and 1996).
20. Id. (observing that restricted access to a region hinders potential investors'
ability to manage their money and, hence, discourages investment). Shatyyeh gave
the following example of the closure adversely affecting foreign investment:
people were very enthusiastic to come and invest in the PA industrial
zones, but I think the closure and related measures . . . make private
sector business life extremely difficult and ha[ve] put people off. We have
$85 million of projects on the ground, but during the closure these have
been hit hard. We couldn't get cement into Gaza. PECDAR [Palestine
Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction] has 144 employ-
ees-70 here in the head office-but only 30 can get in from Nablus,
Jenin and Bethlehem, and this has delayed the public investment pro-
gram for more than a year.
21. See id.
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of furniture in South Carolina who wants to compete for
European markets. Gaza's geographic proximity and labor
costs could put him in an ideal position to do so. He studied
the market and its costs and arranged for land and a busi-
ness partner in Gaza, but his business plan calls for him to
import a container of raw materials and export a container of
finished product every day. This requires routine movements
of goods in and out of Israeli ports, across Israel, and across
the Gaza border, in both directions. He promptly discovered
that Gaza's borders are not traversable on a reliable enough
basis to pursue the risk. His plans are now on hold because,
without reliable ingress and egress, he can neither establish
himself as a reliable supplier to the new markets nor make
payments on an enabling loan. [The Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation] and others provide political risk insurance,
but it does not cover [Israeli] border closings .... .'
Moreover, not only do the closures have the effect of delay-
ing outside investment, they have also hindered the Palestin-
ian investments already in progress. A typical example of how
Palestinian businesses have been affected is a clothing factory
called ABACO in Nablus.' ABACO opened in 1993, shortly
after the Oslo accords, and has been extremely successful with
more than a million dollars in sales in 1995.2' Unfortunately,
due to Israel's tight blockade of Nablus, which was instituted
after terrorist acts, ABACO has had to delay its October deliv-
ery of about 6,600 jeans to a European retailer.' Although a
sympathetic retailer may understand ABACO's predicament, it
is unlikely that any retailer could afford to tolerate the non-
delivery of goods for a lengthy period.
Palestinian companies are not only having problems ship-
ping their goods but are also being prevented from receiving
raw materials. These companies have incurred storage fees
they cannot afford while their shipments are being detained.
For example, the "Arab Paint Company, which employs 26
people, has had to pay storage fees and fines for raw materials
22. Mel Levine, Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo Agreements, 19
FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1393, 1405 (1996).
23. See Christopher Hines, Palestinian Economic Development Goes from Bad
to Worse, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 8, 1996, (International News), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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stuck at the port of Tel Aviv" for several weeks due to the
Nablus blockade.26
Nevertheless, Israel's policy of separation and customs
restrictions has not been the only cause of the terrible econom-
ic situation in Palestine. The PA, led by Mr. Arafat, has been
under constant attack from extremist Palestinian groups, such
as Hamas, to confirm to the Palestinian National Charter,'
which has not yet been truly amended, as was promised by the
PLO in the Declaration of Principles. As previously mentioned,
radical Palestinian groups do not believe in the gradual auton-
omy of the territories but rather prefer a holy war approach to
regaining the territories. Moreover, the failure of the Palestin-
ian Council to denounce the Palestinian National Charter has
been a significant hurdle in establishing trust between the
Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinian National Charter
not only denounces Israel,' but also vows to continue the
armed struggle until the entirety of Palestine, which includes
all of the current territory of Israel, is in Palestinian control. 9
As long as the Palestinian National Charter is left unamended,
the Israeli government can justify its security measures. Sadly,
as one commentator remarked, "Arafat has so often promised
to delete the death warrant for Israel built into the Palestinian
Charter, and collected so often, that a revision becomes a nasty
comedy, of little value even if carried out."0 Therefore, the PA
26. Id.
27. Palestinian National Charter (1968), reprinted in 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT 705-11 (John N. Moore ed. 1974) (instrument of the National Congress
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, held in Cairo, July 1-17, 1968) [here-
inafter Palestinian National Charter].
28. See id. art. 19:
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of
Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they
were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural
right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determi-
nation.
29. See id. art. 9:
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the over-
all strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people
assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their
armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the
liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their
right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-deter-
mination and sovereignty over it.
30. A.M. Rosenthal, Editorial, Israel's Red-Line Map, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
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is doing the Palestinians a disservice by not abiding by their
commitment to firmly denounce the Palestinian National Char-
ter.
The instability and inconsistencies of the PA has made the
international community wary of investing in Palestine." The
PA has attempted to diminish the fear of investment by insti-
tuting the Law on the Encouragement of Investment (Invest-
ment Law) in November, 1995.2 Although the Investment
Law is meant to provide a legal framework and inducements
for foreign investment in Palestine, it possesses some signifi-
cant deficiencies,3 and has been overshadowed by the current
internal instability within the PA and current Israeli policies.
Many commentators have remarked that the territories
are about to explode with frustration at the lack of visible
benefit from the Interim Agreement. Arafat's supporters are
becoming increasingly restless with the negotiation process.
Although Hamas has urged Muslims to confront Israel forceful-
ly, Arafat has managed to keep the situation contained.' The
Israeli practices geared to prevent future hostilities, no matter
how legitimate or justified, may shortly prove only to have
added to the fermentation of hostilities. While Israel may need
to continue some border closures and strict border controls to
safeguard its population, it simultaneously needs to institute
complementing policies and measures which will be geared at
improving the economic conditions in Palestine. For example,
1997, at A19.
31. See Norma Greenway, Fears of Civil War Scaring Off Economic Investment
in Gaza, VANcouvER SUN, Nov. 25, 1994, at A19. Although this article was writ-
ten before the election of the Palestinian Council, the same concerns apply now.
32. See David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis
of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INTL
L.J. 529, 529 (1995). A full-text version of the law, with minor grammatical chang-
es, is appended to this article. See id. at 603.
33. Fidler points to the following problems: "broad discretionary powers; lack
of transparency; restrictions on asset sales; potential problems with the free trans-
ferability of investment sale proceeds, asset sale proceeds, capital, and profits; a
lack of standards for expropriation; and a flawed dispute settlement procedure." Id.
at 594.
34. See, e.g., David Ott, Arafat Running Out of Time, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY,
October 6, 1996, at 15 (reporting that "calls by the movement Hamas for 'total
confrontation' with Israel by Muslim worshippers after Friday's prayers were large-
ly ignored as Palestinians decided to give Arafat the benefit of the doubt-for the
time being").
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Mel Levine noted that:
[Tihe Israelis themselves operate special "convoys" on a rou-
tine, scheduled basis to transport Palestinian goods to Israeli
factories and distributors who rely on Gazan suppliers. Police
inspections and escort patrols are provided so that interrup-
tions are rare and delivery schedules can be met. These are
no doubt expensive and logistically difficult exercises for the
Israeli security system, but it demonstrates that creative
solutions are possible.35
Although the above example is a possible short-term comple-
mentary measure which could be expanded to non-Israeli busi-
nesses, the Palestinians need to be able to rely on Israeli mea-
sures meant to help their economy. Thus, a binding dispute
resolution mechanism would strengthen the dependability of
any Israeli measures. Examining comparative situations of
economically disadvantaged people will highlight the need for
Israel to take serious steps toward furthering the economic
goals of the peace process.
2. How Hostilities are Intertwined with Economic Instability
Montesquieu observed that increasing economic stability is
associated with reduced hostilities. Author Albert Hirschman,
examining the views of Montesquieu and others on that point,
quotes the historian William Robertson, who in 1769 stated the
idea quite succinctly: "'[c]ommerce tends to wear off those prej-
udices which maintain distinction and animosity between na-
tions."36 Of course, the alternative concept is also true, that
economic disadvantage increases hostility.
The struggle against apartheid by the impoverished black
majority in South Africa is illustrative of how economic dispar-
ity and, in this case, racial discrimination, can lead to retalia-
tion and hostilities. Additionally, the success of the African
National Congress is a good example of how gaining political
control is only a first step, and of how maintaining successful
momentum is contingent on the party's achievement of a requi-
35. Levine, supra note 22, at 1407.
36. ALBERT HIRscHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 61 (1977) (quoting
WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE, (Felix Gilbert ed.,
University of Chicago Press 1972) (1769).
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site level of economic and social development.37 As stated by
one commentator, the current South African government is
facing the challenge of strengthening the economy before mili-
tant factions gain support since "[w]ithout commitment to a
program of economic justice, South Africa's attempt to build a
democratic society will be at significant risk of violent political
backlash."5
Critics of Israel's domestic policy have contended that it is
analogous to South Africa's apartheid system.39 Although this
path of inquiry is beyond the scope of this article, it is useful
for Israel to learn from South Africa's past and present experi-
ences and thus help prevent similar difficulties by aiding the
current Palestinian government in creating economic stability
before the militant fundamentalist factions gain overwhelming
popular support.
Yasser Arafat once said during an interview "either we
will have a Somalia because of the starvation of our people or
we will have another economic tiger in this area, especially
because we have the capability to do it. ° Although it has
been shown that economic disadvantage increases hostilities, it
has also been shown that the emergence of a middle class
within the disadvantaged group has significantly decreased
hostilities. For example, Professor Kenneth L. Karst has ob-
served in regard to American ethnic groups that:
37. See Kim Robinson, Note, False Hope or Realizable Right? The Implemen-
tation of the Right to Shelter Under the African National Congress' Proposed Bill
of Rights for South Africa, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 519 (1993).
38. Id. at 512 & n.28 (further observing that "[tihe disaffection, hostility and
pessimism bred by poverty and income disparity create an unstable foundation
upon which to build democratic structures").
39. See, e.g., John Quigley, Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of Israel, 2
IND. INTL & COMP. L. REv. 221 (1991). The author contends that Israeli legisla-
tion and policies have discriminated against Arabs in the context of economic,
political and social rights. He analogizes Israel's ideology of being a state for Jews,
to South Africa's apartheid ideology. For example, the fact that any Jew may
immigrate to Israel, while none of the displaced Palestinians posses an automatic
right to citizenship. See id. at 229. Another example is Israeli legislation which
prohibits the sale of most land to anyone who is not Jewish. See id. at 235. Mr.
Quigley contends that these, and other, examples show how Israel has limited "a
racial group's participation in the social or economic life of the country" in viola-
tion of the Apartheid Convention. Id. at 243. This author does not share Quigley's
view.
40. Gary A. Hengstler & Richard L. Fricker, Yasser Arafat: My Vision, A.B.A.
J. Feb. 1994 at 46, 49.
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Each success for the group in the politics of the wider com-
munity, each material advance, integrates more and more
members of the group into the institutions and processes of
the dominant culture... The achievement of the group's
goals opens progressively more opportunities for members of
the group in the larger society, with the inevitable result that
the group declines as a separate political force.4'
He also observed that, "[clonsciousness of ethnicity, which is
shared widely at all socio-economic levels, decreases as a factor
influencing behavior for people in the middle class."42 Thus, if
Israel strives to help establish a Palestinian middle class, the
result may be a middle class consciousness that is unwilling to
sacrifice its attained place in society by aggressively supporting
fundamentalist factions. Also, the formation of a middle class
may serve to alleviate the uncertainties Israelis have regarding
the type of government which will emerge in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip since "[wihen a country enjoys economic pros-
perity, almost any system of government seems functional."43
This author is not advancing a proposition that a totalitarian
government in Palestine would be acceptable, only that a pros-
perous middle class would most likely lead to election of a type
of government which is representative of this class' economic
concerns. The government elected by a prosperous middle class
is also unlikely to sacrifice economic gain by engaging in detri-
mental hostilities.
The above examples serve to bolster the proposition that
increasing economic stability reduces hostilities. It is interest-
ing to note that countries which have dedicated themselves to
economic growth have been intolerant of surrounding hostili-
ties which threaten their internal economy. For example, the
Economic Community of West African States intervened to
stop the carnage in Liberia." One scholar, Anne-Marie Bur-
ley, remarked that, "the intervenors in West Africa were not
41. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Iden-
tity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 330, 331 (1986).
42. Id. at 330 n.178.
43. Carlos Santiago Nino, The Debate Over Constitutional Reform in Latin
America, 16 FORDHAM INL L.J. 635, 635 (1993).
44. See Anne-Marie Burley, Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. INTL
L.J. 393, 401 (1992).
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members of a collective security organization at all, but of an
economic organization organized around free market principles
and directly threatened by a flood of refugees."45 Burley also
noted that "[tihe European Community has similar motives not
only for peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, but indeed for aiding the
transition to democracy throughout Eastern Europe."46 Al-
though these examples are of multilateral unions, they are
nonetheless demonstrative of the view that hostilities and
economic growth are incompatible.
This Note continues under the premise that by increasing
economic stability in Palestine, Israel could expect a gradual
decrease in hostilities. Currently Israel's efforts are geared at
maintaining internal security and are not motivated by eco-
nomic development concerns for the territories. Although rec-
ommending economic policies is not within the scope of this
Note, Israel's general goal should be a long-term plan to help
Palestinians establish a thriving economy, as the well known
"ancient African proverb instructs us: 'Give a man a fish and
you have fed him for one day, teach him how to fish and you
have fed him for a lifetime." 7 Further, because this Note pro-
poses that Israel should reduce its sovereignty by submitting
to a dispute resolution panel, it will continue by discussing,
first, why other countries have agreed to reduce their sover-
eignty and, second, what enforcement mechanisms those coun-
tries decided were most appropriate.
B. The European Union
1. Motivations Behind the Formation of the European Union
The European Union had its inception in the idea that
collective security would be insured by a common market.48
As one international legal scholar has observed, "the first Eu-
ropean Community was the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, formed in 1951 to integrate production of these critical
factors of war in order to deprive individual states of the abili-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Janice D. ViUiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of
Haitians Seeking Political Asylum in the United States, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841,
928 (1994).
48. See Tamarino, supra note 5, at 114.
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ty to wage war alone." 9 The concept behind the formation of
the first agreement was that when states reduce their sover-
eignty in exchange for a system of economic interdependence
they gain an intensified security because none of the individual
states would risk losing valuable economic ties.
The commitment of the European countries to form a un-
ion was motivated by a history of hostilities within Europe
which culminated with World War II. One of the inciting fac-
tors leading to Hitler's rise to power was Germany's compara-
tive economic disadvantage to its French and English neigh-
bors. Popular support for Hitler increased as the Germans
began to feel the rewards of Hitler's initial economic policies.
Subsequently, the desire for economic advantage was trans-
formed into a yearning for retribution for the "humiliation"
Germany suffered under the Versailles Peace Accord. Also, as
history later showed, the German people turned a blind eye to
Hitler's atrocious violations against humankind in order to
pursue their goal of European domination.
Since the end of War World II, and the near destruction of
Europe and its population (50 million people died), the Europe-
an countries have been on a gradual path towards total unifi-
cation. The original six members of the European Community
(EC)" included Germany. The other five members agreed that
Germany should be a part of the European Community, not
only out of a desire to reduce the German security threat, but
also out of a recognition that having Germany as an ally would
better protect the EC against the rising military threat of the
Soviet Union."'
49. Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration
and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV. INT L.J. 459, 464 (1992).
50. The original members of the European Community were the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See
Jeffrey L. Thompson, The North American Patent Office? A Comparative Look at
the NAFTA, The European Community, and the Community Patent Convention, 27
GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 501, 529 n.46 (1993-1994).
51. See G. Porter Elliott, Neutrality, The Acquis Communautaire and the Eu-
ropean Union's Search for a Common Foreign and Security Policy Under Title V of
the Maastricht Treaty: The Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 25 GA. J.
I1 & COmP. L. 601, 612 (1996).
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2. The Creation of Enforcement Mechanisms
The EC members began the establishment of an enforce-
ment mechanism by signing the Brussels Convention in
1968,2 which declared their mutual commitment to submit
disputes in the area of civil and commercial matters to a com-
mon panel whose decisions would be acknowledged by all
member states to supersede their national law. As one com-
mentator noted, "[tihe Brussels Convention ensures that judg-
ments may move as freely as goods, workers, and capital in the
common market of Europe.""3 In order to effectuate this result
the member states decided that the panel should take the form
of a court and established the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
in 19 7 1 .' Additionally, acquiescence to the enforcement pro-
cedures of the ECJ was a compulsory part of joining the EC.
Although several adjustments were made when subsequent
states joined the EC, the basic principles of the Brussels Con-
vention were left intact.55  The period of the Cold War fur-
ther motivated the European countries to unite in order to
guarantee their mutual security. Because the Brussels
Convention's jurisdiction was limited to civil and commercial
matters, the European countries signed the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Accords). 6
The Helsinki Accords directly addressed issues of security that
could jeopardize the collective security of its members. Al-
though the Helsinki Accords did not address the issue of eco-
nomic instability directly, economic stability was the underly-
ing motivation of the agreement.
Revisions of the Helsinki Accords have gradually increased
the collective powers of the European Union. For example, the
52. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
229.
53. Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of Judgments in the European Com-
munity: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MIcH. J.
INTL L. 559, 573 (1993).
54. See Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Conven-
tion of Sept. 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, June 3, 1971, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 50. This convention, in
an updated and consolidated version, appears at 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in
29 I.L.M 1413.
55. See Reuland, supra note 53, at 568.
56. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No. 8826, Gen 14 I.L.M. 1292.
572 [Vol. XXII2
1997] DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Final Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
(CSCE Report) asserts in its introduction that:
The existence of appropriate dispute settlement procedures is
indispensable for the implementation of the principle that all
disputes should be settled exclusively by peaceful means.
Such procedures are an essential contribution to the
strengthening of the rule of law at the international level and
of international peace and security, and justice... Compli-
ance with binding decisions reached through procedures for
the peaceful settlement of disputes is an essential element in
any overall structure for the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes.
57
The CSCE Report contains many provisions regarding avenues
available for peaceful dispute resolutions, but most important-
ly, the members of the Helsinki Accords agreed to subject
themselves to a mandatory involvement of a third party when
they are not able to settle the dispute through the other ave-
nues provided. 8 Subjection to the involvement of a third par-
ty is another example of reduction in sovereignty by the EC
members due to a recognition that collective security super-
sedes an individual member's foreign affairs agenda.
Furthermore, in February 1992, the EC signed The Treaty
on European Union, (also known as the Maastricht Treaty)
that entered into force on November 1, 1993." It is interest-
ing to note that '[in 1991 Germany sought at Maastricht to
promote political and monetary union on the self-deprecating
basis that it is prudent further to bind Germany to Europe
now, before it derives too much independence and strength
from unification."6 The Maastricht Treaty created an even
closer European Union (EU). The new EU system, , not only
subjected itself to a common economic policy, but also to a
unified foreign security policy, as well as other rights and obli-
gations such as automatic membership to a national of a mem-
57. Report of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Meeting
of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Feb. 8, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 382, 386-87.
58. See id. at 388.
59. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
60. Trachtman, supra note 49, at 464.
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ber state. As a result, the EU is no longer exclusively an eco-
nomic union." Although a discussion of the foreign policy pro-
visions of the EU are beyond the scope of this paper, the agree-
ment to act as a united body is illustrative of the European
decrease in individual state sovereignty in exchange for the
benefits of an interdependent union with a new legal order.62
3. The European Court of Justice as a Model of Dispute
Resolution
The ECJ has the challenge of creating a common legal
process out of the fundamental principles expressed in the
many EC treaties and those found in the member states' legal
tradition.' Such principles include the fundamental rights of
individuals, the principle of fair trial, concepts of legal certain-
ty and non-retroactivity, and the right to be heard in adminis-
trative proceedings.' Although all the member states share
the above principles, their interpretation by the individual
states' courts vary. As a result, the ECJ has had to establish
its own unique legal process.
An example of innovative ECJ rulings has been the ECJ's
removal of the obstacle of sovereign immunity in order to in-
sure compliance by member states with EC law.6" This remov-
al of sovereign immunity enables individuals to bring claims
against their own state, as well as against another EU mem-
ber, for violation of an EC law. Kurt Riechenberg, clerk to
Judge Garcfa-Valdecasas, Court of First Instance of the Euro-
pean Community, Luxembourg, discussed the general princi-
ples that have been set down to determine member state liabil-
ity under provisions of EC law. Riechenberg contends that in
the Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italian Republic decision, for
instance, the ECJ "laid down three conditions for the establish-
ment of [a member state's] liability: (1) an implied grant of
rights to individuals, (2) the provision identifies the content of
61. See Sari KYM. Laitinen-Rawana, Creating a Unified Europe: Maastricht
Treaty and Beyond, 28 INTL LAW. 973, 990 (1994).
62. See Kurt Reichenberg, The Merger of Trading Blocks and the Creation of
the European Economic Area: Legal and Judicial Issues, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 63, 67-68 (1995).
63. See id. at 71.
64. See id.
65. See id.
[Vol. XXIII:2574
1997] DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
those rights, and (3) a casual link must exist between the
breach of the Member State's obligation and the harm suf-
fered.' r Satisfying the above conditions is a prerequisite to
receiving damages for a member state's breach of EC law. The
existence of a private cause of action within the EU will be
discussed as a possible model for broad jurisdiction in the
proposal of dispute settlement section of this Note.
For the purpose of this Note it is enough to understand
that the EU has chosen to create a common court as its dis-
pute settlement mechanism. It has given this court the power
to interpret how all the treaties work together, as well as what
type of damages the losing state would be responsible to pay.
This court's jurisdiction has gradually expanded, as illustrated
by the ability of an individual from any EU state to bring a
cause of action against any EU country. This broad jurisdiction
has contributed to the view that the European countries are
really unified.
C. Discussion of NAFTA and its Dispute Resolution
1. Reasons for the Formation of NAFTA
The impetus behind the formation of NAFTA is very differ-
ent from the concern for mutual security which motivated the
formation of the EU. Because the United States, Canada and
Mexico's history of conflict is relatively mild, they did not have
to focus on mutual security as the goal of integration. Rather,
the formation of NAFTA arose out of a recognition that region-
al economic integration and interdependence would be mutual-
ly beneficial on an economic level.
Each NAFTA country had its own reasons for wanting to
take part in the agreement. Mexico, as the smallest economy of
,t* three countries, had the most to gain from NAFTA since
membership could "help alleviate Mexico's crippling debt ser-
vice burden and help finance the current account deficit by
encouraging foreign direct investment and the return of flight
capital ..... 67 Additionally, membership in NAFTA would
give Mexico access to the broader North American market, as
66. Id. at 72 (citing Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, Joined Cases
C-6/90 & C-9/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357).
67. Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, Options for a Hemispheric Trade
Order, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 261, 282 (1991).
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well as help implement its domestic reforms.'
The Canadian and U.S. interests were quite different from
Mexico's. Canada's motivations were geared toward defending
its existing interests under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment, and dealing "with such questions as trade in automo-
biles and parts and natural gas flows."69 The United States'
motivations were both political and economic. The United
States felt that economic integration would help promote a
stable democratic government in Mexico, which would serve as
a model for other countries in Latin America." Additionally:
A prosperous Mexico would become a thriving market for
U.S. exports, providing a particular boost to the economies of
border states such as California, Texas, New Mexico, and
Arizona. At the same time, growth in the Mexican economy
would create new jobs and increase wages in Mexico and thus
help stem the tide of illegal immigration.71
Although both the United States and Canada stood to lose
some of their labor-intensive industries due to the low wages
in Mexico, they hoped to eventually off set this loss by export-
ing more sophisticated equipment to Mexico, and by being
more competitive in the world market by accessing Mexico's
pool of low-wage labor.72
As demonstrated, each party had its own incentives for
seeking economic integration. However, unlike the EU, the
parties wanted to achieve this integration with a minimal re-
duction in sovereignty. Gary N. Horlick noted that:
The main debate about NAFTA in terms of sovereignty was
over the labor and environmental side agreements. Now this
is interesting, because the agreements by their terms make
no change at all in the labor and environmental laws of any
of the three countries. The discussion was explicitly limited
to ensuring that each country enforces its own laws. Obvious-
ly you have a sovereign right to decide if you are enforcing
your own laws, and what was being talked about was "giving
that up." But you were not talking about changes in either
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 282-83.
72. See id. at 283.
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who enforces the laws or what the laws were. Again, contrast
this with the European Union, where international bureau-
crats in Brussels make the rules, and often ensure en-
forcement.73
As exemplified by the above-mentioned side agreements,
NAFTA is aimed at limited concessions of sovereignty. Howev-
er, some concessions were made on the part of Mexico, which
were attributable to its desire to be included in a regional free
trade agreement. For example, a Chapter 11 investor-state
dispute resolution system was basically aimed at Mexico giving
up its Calvo Clause, which limits investors to suing in the
courts of the host country.74 Thus, instead of having to resort
to Mexican courts to address Mexican NAFTA violations, the
investor can resort to arbitration.75
2. Type of Dispute Resolution Mechanism Chosen
The parties to NAFTA agreed to arbitration as the main
dispute settlement mechanism. NAFTA requires the Free
Trade Commission to establish an arbitration panel upon re-
quest from a complaining party.76 NAFTA's Chapter 20"
governs the Dispute Settlement Procedures agreed to between
the parties. Andrew Kayumi Rosa elaborated on Chapter 20
and noted that:
The general dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA apply in
three situations: first, where a dispute exists between the
Parties over the interpretation or application of NAFTA; sec-
ond, where a Party believes that another Party's actual or
proposed measure is inconsistent with NAFTA; and finally,
where a Party believes such a measure is consistent with
NAFTA but causes nullification or impairment of any benefit
reasonably to be expected under most NAFTA provisions.7"
73. Gary N. Horlick, Sovereignty and International Trade Regulation, 20 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 57, 60 (1994).
74. See id. at 61.
75. See id.
76. See NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2008(2), 32 I.L.M. 695.
77. Id. arts. 2001-2022, 32 I.L.M. 693-99.
78. Andrew Kayumi Rosa, Old Wine, New Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of
International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 MICH. J. INTIL L. 255, 262-63 (1993)
(citations omitted).
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Additionally, Chapter 20 establishes that if there are any dis-
putes which arise under both NAFTA and the GATT then the
party bringing the claim has a choice as to which forum will
hear the claim.79 However, if the third party wants to take
part in the claim and the two parties cannot agree on the fo-
rum, then the NAFTA forum will prevail.0
Under NAFTA, parties must use consultations and arbitra-
tion prior to requesting the formation of an arbitration pan-
el.s ' If the parties are unable to solve their dispute, they may
request the NAFTA Commission to provide "good offices, con-
ciliation, [or] mediation.8 2 However, if within thirty days the
Commissions involvement proves unhelpful then either party
may request an arbitration panel.' NAFTA's arbitration pan-
els are made up of five panelists selected from a roster com-
prised of persons with "expertise or experience in law, interna-
tional trade," or other matters appropriate to dispute resolu-
tion under NAFTA. 4 The disputing parties have to agree on
the panel's chairperson. Then each party may choose two citi-
zens from the opposing party's list of nominees.' Once a pan-
el is selected, the dispute settlement procedures allow for at
least one hearing. The procedures further provide for an oppor-
tunity to submit writings explaining a party's initial position
and rebutting the positions of the other party or parties. Under
the procedures all hearings, deliberations, and written submis-
sions are confidential."
Once the proceedings are completed, the panel must issue
an initial report within a period specified under Article 2016 of
NAFTA (90 days) or under such other period as may be agreed
upon by the parties or pursuant to procedural rules authorized
by Article 1202(1) of NAFTA."7 After the submission of the
panel's initial report, the parties have fourteen days to make
79. See NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2005(1), 32 I.L.M. 694.
80. See id. art. 2005(2), 32 I.L.M. 694.
81. See id. art. 2007, 32 I.L.M. 695.
82. Id. art. 2007(5)(b), 32 I.L.M. 695.
83. See id. art. 2008(1), 32 I.L.M. 695.
84. Id. at art. 2009(2), 32 I.L.M. 695.
85. See id. art. 2011(1), 32 I.L.M. 696. These procedures differ slightly where
mare than two parties are involved in a dispute. See id. art. 2011(2), 32 I.L.M.
696.
86. See id. art. 2012(1), 32 I.L.M. 696.
87. See id. arts 2012(1)(b), 2016(2), 32 I.L.M. 696, 697.
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comments, if they so choose8s As one commentator noted,
"[tlhis phase provides parties with another opportunity to voice
their views, and therefore may increase compliance with panel
reports because parties are more likely to feel they had signifi-
cant input into the panel decision." 9 Subsequently, the panel
may modify its determinations and within thirty days issue its
final report.' The final report does not identify which panel-
ists are associated with majority and minority opinions con-
tained therein.9 Moreover, this final report is not eligible for
an appeal unless it concerns a trade dispute.92 The above pan-
el composition, secrecy provisions, and possibility of appeal are
illustrative of a possible model for a proposed dispute settle-
ment mechanism for the Interim Agreement, and will be re-
ferred to in Part IV of this Note.
Finally, NAFTA's enforcement of the dispute is left to the
disputing parties. The preferred resolution is for the losing
party to conform to the ruling. Failing such a resolution, the
losing party may pay compensation to the victorious party."
If the parties are unable to agree on the appropriate compensa-
tion then the victorious party may suspend benefits of equiva-
lent effect until a mutually agreed-upon solution is negotiat-
ed.'
In light of these provisions NAFTA's dispute resolution
provisions can accurately be characterized as more of an aid to
the parties in their conflict rather than an imposition of a
mandatory solution. Significantly, NAFTA does not provide for
surveillance of the parties' progress, which is another indica-
tion that NAFTA is a self-monitoring agreement. As a result,
NAFTA relies on the parties' compliance and desire to main-
tain an economic union. This Note, in Part IV, will rely on the
88. See id. art. 2016(4), 32 I.L.M. 696.
89. Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA- Marrying Effective Dispute
Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 228 (1995).
90. See NAFTA, supra note 6, arts. 2016(5), 2017(1), 32 I.L.M. 697.
91. See id. art. 2017(2), at 697. -This secrecy," one author observed, "could
provide greater compliance with panel reports as parties have no basis to complain
that decisions were made according to the national interests of the panelists."
Straight, supra note 89, at 228 (but additionally cautioning that "secrecy may
cause countries to reject panel decisions based on a belief that decisions are secret-
ly partisan").
92. See NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(5), 32 I.L.M. 683.
93. See id. art. 2018(2), 32 I.L.M. 697.
94. See id. art. 2019(1), 32 I.L.M. 697.
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NAFTA model of dispute resolution, with its minimal decrease
in sovereignty, as a possible starting point for resolutions of
disputes between Israel and Palestine.
C. From the GATT to the WTO
1. Reasons for the Formation of the GATT and the WTO
The original contracting parties to the GATT unified in
order to create an "international economic law." The GATT
grew out of negotiations by the victorious allied countries in
1947, and since then has expanded to include most of the
world's nations." One student of the GATT noted that:
[t]he drafters of the GATT 1947 were amenable to the inclu-
sion of a provision on customs unions and frontier traffic,
perhaps to insure the agreement of the European countries,
particularly in light of their strong leaning toward regional-
-ism. Because economic troubles were a major factor behind
World Wars I and II, a certain degree of economic cohesion in
Europe was viewed as a mechanism which would prevent
further hostilities.'
Thus, the founders of the GATT recognized the motivation of
the European countries to forge an economic union in order to
reduce their security concerns, and factored in these concerns
when drafting the GATT agreements.
Over the years the GATT has evolved from solely covering
trade in goods to encompassing trade in services, aspects of
foreign direct investment, agreements on agriculture and tex-
tiles, and intellectual property rights." It has also reduced
tariffs in diverse sectors such as pharmaceuticals, automobiles,
95. Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
17 U. PA. J. INTL EcoN. L. 555, 555 (1996).
96. See id. at 555-56.
97. Paul Carrier, An Assessment of Regional Economic Integration Agreements
After the Uruguay Round, 9 N.Y INT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (citations omitted).
Carrier quotes a former U.S. State Department Official as observing that "[a]
customs union creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to competition,
makes possible a more economic allocation of resources, and thus operates to in-
crease production and raise planes of living.'" Id. at 8 (quoting CLAIR WILCOX, A
CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 70-71 (1949).
98. See William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAAM INT'L L.J. 427, 427-28 (1995).
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steel, and food products.' These latest additions to the GATT
emerged in 1994 during the Uruguay Round in which the con-
tracting parties agreed to the formation of the WTO." ° Addi-
tionally, during these rounds of negotiations, the contracting
parties agreed to the "development of a mechanism for authori-
tative interpretation and enforcement of GATT substantive
law," "0 which was to be incorporated into the functions of the
WTO.
The original contracting parties, and those that followed,
accepted the fact that in order to thrive in this increasingly
global market there must be a monitoring system. Submission
of disputes for resolution has been in existence since the first
GATT agreements, but unfortunately the original GATT dis-
pute resolution mechanism was not very effective because it
lacked provisions for enforcement of rulings.0 2 Instead, com-
pliance was left to the discretion of the losing state."3 As one
commentator pointed out, results of a study conducted by Pro-
fessor Robert E. Hudec, who analyzed all of the GATT's dis-
pute resolutions since its inception, indicated a recent decline
in the extent of compliance with panel decisions:
From 1948 until the cases of the 1980's, in cases with known
rulings in favor of complainants, Hudec classified twenty-
seven (100%) as ending with full satisfaction or partial satis-
faction; none had a "negative outcome," and most (eighty-six
percent) were in the "full satisfaction" group. This picture,
however, changed substantially in the decade of the 1980s.
During this period, Hudec placed seven cases (eighteen per-
cent) in the category of negative outcomes. Hudec classified
five cases (thirteen percent) as complete defiance (no action);
in two cases (five percent) the losing party complied but only
after the complainant paid a "price" to which the violator was
not entitled under the ruling or by GATT law. This increase
in noncompliance and "negative outcomes" provided an impe-
tus to restructure the GATT dispute resolution system."°4
Because of this ineffectiveness, the parties made several modi-
99. See id.
100. See Reitz, supra note 95, at 556-57; WTO Agreement art. 1.
101. Reitz, supra note 95, at 558.
102. See id. at 564.
103. See id. at 570.
104. Id. at 570-72.
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fications which culminated in the formation of the 1994 Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU).0 5 The formation of the DSU was so crucial
because inaction in light of increasing non-compliance could
have transformed non-compliance into international custom,
thereby placing the entire force of GATT obligations in jeopar-
dy. To prevent this result, the contracting parties agreed that
membership in the WTO would be mandatory for all GATT
members, and that decisions by the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) would be binding."'6
The WTO's stronger enforcement mechanism has brought
the issue of loss in national sovereignty to the forefront. Pro-
fessor Curtis Reitz observed that:
Chauvinistic believers in unfettered national sovereignty see
the WTO dispute resolution system as a major threat. Views
of that kind will be found in all parts of the world, from the
most developed to the least developed nations. Their cries of
alarm will sound particularly in democracies in election
times. There is, of course, another, and better, view. It is in
each nation's deepest sovereign interest to be part of a legal
order that stimulates and regulates growth of the global
economy. National interests will be advanced both economi-
cally and politically by an effective international legal or-
der.10
7
Contracting parties that are willing to forego all GATT
105. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
106. Id. art. 2.
107. Reitz, supra note 95, at 599. Reitz further observed that:
[e]nlightened national government leaders see the explosive growth of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) as an important reason for the estab-
lishment of a regime of international economic law. As MNEs grow in
size and economic power, they have the capacity to take actions that are
effectively beyond the control of any national government.
Id. at 599 n.201.
One commentator contends that:
critics charge that the WTO will be run by international bureaucrats who
will operate in secrecy with no accountability and no conflict of interest
rules. The essence of these arguments rests on the notion of lost sover-
eignty-in signing the Uruguay Round Agreements, the United States has
lost much of its negotiating authority on international trade matters and
has subjected domestic matters to international regulation.
See Aceves, supra note 98, at 428 (citations omitted).
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benefits because they fear infringement of their sovereignty,
can utilize a provision which gives every country a right to
withdraw from the WTO. Some countries that do not want to
lose all GATT benefits, but who fear that their national sover-
eignty is being jeopardized, have implemented complimentary
national legislation to address their concerns. For example, the
United States Congress is in the process of reviewing proposed
legislation which will institute a national WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Review Commission to complement the United States'
implementing legislation of the DSU.08 The proposal pro-
vides that "any Member of Congress can introduce a Joint
Resolution to disapprove of U.S. participation in the WTO if
the Commission makes three affirmative determinations [that
the interests of the United States are not being served by
membership in the WTO] in any five-year period."0 9 Howev-
er, even if this proposed legislation becomes national law, it
will not effect U.S. international obligations, unless the United
States decides on complete withdrawal from the WTO." ° This
legislation appears to be purely political since a complete Unit-
ed States withdrawal from the WTO is extremely unlikely and
would result in a total loss of rights provided by the
WTO-such as Most Favored Nation status-thereby de-
creasing United States competitiveness in the global market.
Since none of the contracting parties, including the ones
which have complained about the reduction of sovereignty,
have exercised their right to withdraw from the WTO,"' it is
evident that they recognize the overriding importance of eco-
nomic integration and how essential it is to continue moving
toward increased enforcement in order to create a uniform
international economic order. As one commentator contends
"states must choose between the uncertainty of multilateral
cooperation and the short term benefits of unilateral ac-
tion."" Also, as noted by Robert Keohane:
108. See Aceves, supra note 98, at 471.
109. Id. at 471.
110. Id. at 474.
111. See id. at 436.
112. Id. at 472. Aceves finds this situation analogous to Rousseau's parable of
the stag hunt: "[iun the parable of the stag hunt, several hunters agree to cooper-
ate to catch a stag .... When one hunter defects from the group in order to
catch a rabbit, the group fails to catch the stag." Id. at n.238 (quoting J.J. Rous-
seau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, in BASIc POLITCAL WRITINGS OF
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Committing oneself to an international regime implies a
decision to restrict one's own pursuit of advantage on specific
issues in the future. Certain alternatives that might other-
wise appear desirable-imposing quotas, manipulating ex-
change rates, hoarding one's own oil in a crises-become
unacceptable by the standards of the regime .... Where
there are substantial common interests to be realized through
agreement, the value of a reputation for faithfully carrying
out agreements may outweigh the costs of consistently ac-
cepting the constraints of international rules. To pursue self-
interest does not require maximizing freedom of action. On
the contrary, intelligent and far-sighted leaders understand
that attainment of their objectives may depend on their com-
mitment to the institutions that make cooperation possi-
ble.113
2. The WTO's Enforcement Powers and Panel Makeup
The DSU provides for an extremely elaborate dispute reso-
lution mechanism. The striking difference between the pre-
1994 DSB and the current one is the establishment of an Ap-
pellate Body which has very similar characteristics to a judi-
ciary body and is empowered to look beyond the materials
provided by the litigants to formulate its decisions. Further-
more, this Appellate Body's purpose is to establish a uniform
substantive law on which the contracting parties can rely. The
Appellate Body's decisions will serve as an interpretive aid to
lower DSB panels. This Appellate Body is creating a system of
stare decisis in order to provide conformity and stability in
international economic law. The creation of an Appellate Body
within the Interim Agreement, and in the future within the
final agreement, could help Israel and Palestine create their
own economic law suitable to their unique situation.
Another important divergence from the pre-1994 DSB is
the creation of remedies for victorious contracting parties.
While in the past the system was based solely on the consen-
sus of the DSB's members, which consist of all the contracting
parties, and empowers each with one vote, the new system
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 62 (Donald Cress trans. 1987).
113. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 258-59 (1984).
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allows remedies to be enforceable even if there are dissenting
parties. In this way no one country can derail the DSB's deci-
sion.
The remedies available are based on a preference system.
The most favored remedy is compliance. This is the least con-
troversial method and requires no enforcement. If a country
refuses to comply, then the DSU provides that the parties
enter into compensation negotiations and the WTO
Secretariat's office may assist them to make sure they are in
conformity with the GATT agreements." However, the com-
pensation remedy is a voluntary process that must be entered
into with the agreement of both parties. Therefore, if the losing
party is not complying and is refusing to enter into compensa-
tion negotiations," 5 the prevailing party can proceed to the
third remedy, which is the suspension of concessions or obliga-
tions that does not require the assent of the losing party."6
The complaining party may apply to the DSB for the establish-
ment of a panel to rule on the appropriate suspension of con-
cessions or obligations." The Secretariat will then nominate
three individuals to compose this panel."' This three-tiered
approach to remedies may be a useful guide in the develop-
ment of the enforcement provisions of the proposed dispute
settlement mechanism.
Throughout the GATT's dispute resolution process a major
concern has been to ensure that the panelists are not influ-
enced by their respective governments. As a result of the above
concern, panels established by the DSB's are not comprised
solely *of government officials but also include third party non-
government experts. Neither government officials nor non-
government experts may serve on a panel where they will be
placed in the position of being citizens of a party to the dis-
pute.' Governments are, moreover, forbidden from attempt-
114. See Reitz, supra note 95, at 590.
115. Before proceeding to this third remedy, a complaining party must have
been unable to solve a dispute through negotiations, or through the utilization of
procedures provided by the DSU such as consultations, good offices, conciliation or
mediation. See Aceves, supra note 98, at 439.
116. See Reitz, supra note 95, at 591.
117. Aceves, supra note 98, at 439.
118. See id.
119. DSU art. 8(3) (but creating an exception to this requirement where "the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise").
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ing to influence any of their citizens who are serving on a pan-
el. 12' Additionally, parties are not permitted to object to panel
nominees unless they have a "compelling reason."12' If any of
the parties objects to these nominations and cannot agree
within twenty days, then the DSU calls for the Director-Gener-
al to choose the "most appropriate" panelists following consul-
tations with the parties, the chairman of the DSB, and the
committee or council handling the dispute.'m Having a super-
vising committee within the proposed dispute settlement mech-
anism of the Interim Agreement may be a necessary element,
and the reasons will be discussed in that section.
Once the final panel is in place, the parties provide it with
written reports and are given two opportunities to present oral
argument.' As mentioned previously, the panel is empow-
ered to look beyond the sources provided by the parties, as well
as to consult its own experts." Moreover, the panel must fol-
low prescribed procedures which are in place to alleviate the
concerns of politically motivated decision making.' Finally,
the panel's deliberations are confidential until it issues its
Interim Report.
26
This third stage in the remedy process, although not re-
quiring assent, still embodies some of the pre-1994 GATT con-
sensus ideology. The prevailing party has to submit its sug-
gestions for suspension of concessions to the DSB. The DSB
then considers whether to authorize a suspension of conces-
sions or obligations.' Professor Curtis Reitz elaborated on
this process and noted that:
When the DSB considers authorizing a suspension of conces-
sions or obligations, the GATT 1947 consensus rule applies,
not the new GATT 1994 consensus rule that applies to adop-
tion of reports. If one member present at the meeting of the
120. Id. art. 8(9).
121. Id. art. 8(6). A compelling reason for an objection might include a party's
belief that a panelist may be biased. See Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description
of How a GAT2 Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J. INVL ARB. 53, 71 (1987).
122. DSU art. 8(7).
123. See Aceves, supra note 98, at 440.
124. See id.
125. See Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers
Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 406 (1995). Young criticizes the pro-
cedural rules as being too weak.
126. See id.
127. See Reitz, supra note 95, at 592.
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DSB formally objects to the DSB's granting authorization
without arbitration, a consensus would be lacking and the
DSB could not act beyond noting that it failed to reach a
consensus. Since parties to a dispute are not disqualified
from participation in DSB deliberations, the losing party can
block the suspension proposed by the prevailing party.
Of the possible DSB actions, resort to the arbitration
procedure is the course most likely to occur. Parties who have
lost in the merits phase of cases will face considerable politi-
cal pressure not to block DSB action on a motion to refer the
action to arbitration.'
Therefore, even though consensus is needed for a decision not
to go to arbitration, it only goes to arbitration on the question
of whether the recommended suspension of concessions is
"'equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment." 2 9
The parties must accept, and the DSB must approve, the re-
sults of this arbitration. The only way to block this decision is
for the DSB to decide "by consensus not to adopt the report" of
the arbitration panel. 30
Another change in the DSB is its authorization to estab-
lish an Appellate Body to hear appeals from panel reports. 3'
As one author points out, the Appellate Body's "report shall be
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the par-
ties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the report within thirty days following its circulation to
the DSB Members."3 2 The entire process, from the establish-
ment of the panel, to the determination of the time frame for
the implementation of the remedies, may not exceed fifteen
months. 3 '
In order to increase enforcement under the DSU, the DSB
has been empowered to conduct continuous surveillance of the
losing party's compliance with the panel's decision. For exam-
128. Id. at 592 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 593 (quoting DSU art. 22(7)).
130. Aceves, supra note 98, at 441.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 441-42 (noting that "[plrompt compliance with recommendations
and rulings of the DSB is essential to ensure the DSB's effective resolution of
disputes. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the DSB's recommenda-
tions and rulings, the Member State is granted a reasonable time in which to do
so").
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ple, the DSB now requires the losing party to submit a compli-
ance time frame, and automatically approves unilateral deci-
sions by the prevailing party to withdraw concessions approved
by the panel if that time frame is not followed." However,
there are many critics of the withdrawal of concessions. For
example, Professor Michael K. Young noted that:
[i]f the economic disparity between the disputants is great,
this threat may be of relatively little significance to the of-
fending country. Moreover, as economists often note, with-
drawing concessions is the oddest sort of sanction because it
frequently hurts the country enforcing the sanction almost as
much as it hurts the country against which the sanction is
imposed."
Additionally, Young observed that:
[tihe GATT does not provide for any concerted action against
the offending party, [such as] expulsion from the GATT, or
any other types of international sanctions that would genu-
inely ensure compliance .... [Thus] until the sanctions for
non-compliance are enhanced, enforcement of rulings and rec-
ommendations will always remain somewhat problematic.13
Further, the DSB is not empowered to take any action once a
country has withdrawn from the WTO. As a result, every coun-
try has the ability to disregard the DSB's decisions, but as
mentioned above, this disregard is at the cost of losing a cru-
cial membership in the global economic order.
Although there are critics who claim that the DSB falls
short of the enforcement necessary to make the process truly
binding, most agree that the GATT and the global economic
order, are steadily moving in the right direction and that the
DSU is an improvement in the enforcement mechanism. Even
critic Michael K. Young, acknowledged that:
On balance the changes generated by the Understanding are
a clear step in the direction of creating a more coherent,
consistent, comprehensive, and obeyed set of GATT principles
and rules. The provisions of the Understanding appreciably
increase the likelihood that GATT disputes will be more effi-
134. See Young, supra note 125, at 402-05.
135. Id. at 408.
136. Id.
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ciently resolved and that the parties will enjoy more of the
benefits for which they negotiated.137
The discussion of the above international agreements will
aid in the formulation of proposals of an enforcement mecha-
nism for the Interim Agreement. It is first important to under-
stand the Interim Agreement, since it is the governing agree-
ment between the parties, as well as to understand the current
problems which may constitute violations of the Interim Agree-
ment.
III. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
The current version of the Interim Agreement, which was
signed in Washington, D.C., on September 28, 1995,18 is an-
other step in a series of negotiations that began with the 1978
Camp David Accord, where the issues of territorial autonomy
and self-government of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were
raised as identified goals.' These proposed negotiations
were slow to begin because of the increasing hostilities be-
tween the parties and the reluctance of Israel to recognize the
PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people, as
well as the matched reluctance of the PLO to recognize Israel
as a state.4" Nevertheless, Israel began secret negotiations
with the PLO's leader Yasser Arafat which led to the Norway
negotiations,' and culminated with the Declaration of Prin-
ciples in 1993.142
Since the Declaration of Principles was signed in 1993,
Israel and the PLO have continued negotiations and have
implemented several steps, such as the Israeli military with-
drawal from Gaza and Jericho in the summer of 1994,4. as
well as the election of a Palestinian Council on January 20,
1996. Although these steps complied with the Interim Agree-
137. Id. at 409.
138. Interim Agreement, supra note 1, at 29.
139. See A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,
Sept. 17, 1978, Isr.-Egypt, 1136 U.N.T.S. 196.
140. See Palestinian National Charter, supra note 27, at 709.
141. See Clyde Haberman, How Oslo Helped Mold the Mideast Pact: The Secret
Peace, N.Y. TIMs, Sept. 5, 1993, at Al.
142. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 10.
143. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-
P.L.O., 33 I.L.M. 622.
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ment, the surrounding political situation, which was discussed
previously, has led to economic decline in the territories.
A. Is The Interim Agreement Binding?
The first issue that emerges when discussing the Interim
Agreement is that Israel and Palestine do not have equal rec-
ognition by international legal standards. Israel is a recognized
state, while Palestine is only an autonomous territory. Al-
though several autonomous regions have enjoyed equal rights
under such prominent international treaties as the GATT, 14
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Con-
vention)45 has codified the international norm that treaties
are enforceable only if they are concluded between states.
Whether the current status of Palestine qualifies it as a
state under international law is a matter of great debate.46
Under the RESTATEMENT (THMD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, in order to qualify as a state,
Palestine must possess four basic qualities. These qualifica-
tions are: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory;
(3) government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with
other states.47 Although Palestine has a defined territory, a
population, and government, it lacks full capacity to enter into
relations with other states.4" Under the Interim Agreement
it is evident that Israel clearly refuses to embody the territo-
ries with state status. Article 9 of the Interim Agreement spe-
cifically states that:
144. See Hong Kong Joins GATT, Separate Membership to Continue Even Un-
der Chinese Sovereignty, 3 INTL TRADE REP. (BNA) 581, 581 (1986) (reporting that
"A GATT announcement April 23 said Hong Kong would be a full contracting
party as a result of a British declaration to the GATT Secretariat under Article
XXVI/5 (c) of the agreement. This article states that, if any colony acquires full
autonomy, it shall be eligible for GATT membership as though it were an indepen-
dent country").
145. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 1,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention].
146. See Jeffrey Weiss, Terminating the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Is
it Legal Under International Law?, 18 LoY. LA. INIL & COMP. L.J. 109, 126
(1995); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 146, § 201.
148. See Weiss, supra note 146, at 127 (observing that the Declaration of Prin-
ciples "and subsequent agreements . . . limit control exercised by the autonomous
PLO, and nullify any PLO authority to conduct international relations").
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In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have pow-
ers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations,
which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies,
consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or
permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza
Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and
consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions. 49
Thus, by the terms of their agreement, it appears that Pales-
tine does not meet the qualifications needed to be recognized
as a state under international law.
This Note assumes, for the above reasons and under the
Vienna Convention, that the Interim Agreement is not fully
enforceable by Palestine under international law. The Pales-
tinian fear that they have entered into an unenforceable agree-
ment has been the basis for the increasing distrust, insecurity,
and the Palestinians' sense of being at the "mercy" of the Is-
raeli government. Also, the Israeli delays and threats to
change the Interim Agreement have fostered distrust in the
international investment community because it is unclear
which governmental authority will be responsible for oversee-
ing the investment. For example, if a company enters into an
investment contract with the PA under the beneficial terms of
the Palestinian Investment Law, and, subsequently, the Israeli
government decides to usurp Palestinian control, then the
investor is left unsure if its contractual rights would be guar-
anteed by Israel. This investor insecurity could be rectified by
establishing a dispute settlement panel, accessible to private
parties, which could enforce the terms of the original contract
regardless of Israeli intervention. This would off set the fear of
investment in Palestine while not foreclosing Israel's ability to
act for security reasons. The different types of dispute settle-
ment arrangements, including the proposal of a limited juris-
diction for foreign investors, will be advanced later in this Note
after the following elaboration on what has been currently
agreed to in the Interim Agreement.
149. See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9(5).
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B. Clauses in the Interim Agreement which Illustrate the Need
for an Enforcement Mechanism
The Interim Agreement demonstrates that the Israeli
government is not willing to diminish its control over Pales-
tine. The Interim Agreement, like the Declaration of Princi-
ples, is an arrangement that will only be successful if the Par-
ties act in good faith.150
The constant shift in power within Israel further exacer-
bates the problem of enforceability being dependent on the
goodwill of the parties, since any implementation of an added
provision needs to be arrived at by mutual agreement. Article
21 of the Interim Agreement, which governs settlement of dif-
ferences and disputes, calls first for negotiations between the
parties' and, second, for conciliation to be agreed upon be-
tween the parties.5 2 Where a dispute cannot be settled either
through negotiation or conciliation, the Interim Agreement
provides for the possibility of submission of a dispute to an
Arbitration Committee.'53 However, this possibility is wholly
contingent upon the agreement of both parties.'" Article 26
of the agreement elaborates on the Joint Israeli-Palestinian
Liaison Committee (Committee). It states that the Committee
shall be made up of an equal number of members from each
party, and that it should reach decisions by agreement. The
Committee is also responsible for monitoring the implementa-
tion of the Interim Agreement.' The same language is found
in the Economic Protocol with regard to the Joint Economic
150. For instance Weiss writes that:
the provision [in the DOP] requiring the negotiation of a final status
arrangement leaves much "to the goodwill of the two Parties," and an
agreement "is to a large extent contingent upon the future political atti-
tude of the Parties and their continuing desire to come to terms and
strike substantive deals on this intricate web of problems."
Weiss, supra note 146, at 130 n.106 (quoting Antonin Cassese, The Israeli-PLO
Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EuR. J. INTL L. 564, 568 (1993)).
151. See Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
152. See id. art. 21(2) (providing that "[disputes which cannot be settled by
negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between
the parties").
153. See id. art. 21(3).
154. See id. (providing that "[tihe parties may agree to submit to arbitration
disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through concili-
ation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish
an Arbitration Committee").
155. See id. art. 24(1), (2).
592 [Vol. XXIII:2
1997] DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Committee, which is responsible for the implementation of the
'Protocol.' 56 Although these references to cooperation and im-
plementation exist in the Interim Agreement, there are no
actual procedures beyond the aspirational language. These
procedural voids can only be filled by the parties reaching a
decision by "agreement,"15 7 which means by consensus of both
parties. As was discussed in the context of the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism, the contracting parties abandoned most
of the consensus based decision making because it was ineffec-
tive in bringing disputes to settlement.
Additionally, the Interim Agreement is steeped with vague
generalized language. For example, Article 9(3), which governs
industry within the Economic Protocol, states that "[elach side
will do its best to avoid damage to the industry of the other
side and will take into consideration the concerns of the other
side in its industrial policy."5 ' Because there is no neutral
dispute settlement mechanism, each party is currently respon-
sible for deciding what constitutes doing its best. This has
enabled Israel to interpret the Interim Agreement broadly in
order to continue its policies of separation and tight customs
restrictions.
Nevertheless, several articles are very specific regarding
obligations. For example, Article 15, entitled "Prevention of
Hostile Acts," states that, "[b]oth sides shall take all measures
necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hos-
tilities directed against each other, against individuals falling
under the other's authority and against their property, and
shall take legal measures against offenders."' This article
exemplifies the Israeli fear that when Israeli forces withdraw
from the territories, the PA forces will not "take all measures
necessary" in order to control the Palestinian people. This
article further illustrates how the previously mentioned arti-
cles are not meant to be binding, since where Israel wanted
the Interim Agreement to be binding, the agreement contains
enabling language.
Additionally, Article 15 is a reiteration of Israel's right
under international law to do whatever is necessary in the
156. See Economic Protocol, supra note 14, art. 2, 33 I.L.M. 697.
157. Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 24(4).
158. Economic Protocol, supra note 14, art. 9(3) (emphasis added).
159. Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 15(1).
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name of security.'" Jeffrey Weiss, who analyzed the legality
of a full unilateral termination of the Interim Agreement, not-
ed that although there may be international political circum-
stances for a termination, "[als a matter of international law,
suspension or termination would be within Israel's rights." 6'
Therefore, any proposal for dispute settlement, no matter how
binding, would never foreclose Israel from protecting its people
in the case of a security threat.
6 2
IV. PROPOSALS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
The type of dispute settlement panel which should be
established depends on the range of problems which Israel
believes needs to be addressed and the amount of sovereignty
it is willing to forego. Since Israel would be decreasing its
sovereignty it could begin the process by agreeing to empower
a DSB with limited jurisdiction and increase the DSB's juris-
diction as the parties become more economically interdepen-
dent.
A good starting point for Israel would be to subject itself to
jurisdiction which will focus solely on strengthening the reli-
ability of foreign investment in Palestine. One example might
be recognition of causes of action which would enable only
foreign investors to bring claims of infringements of their eco-
nomic rights by Israel, such as those provided by ICSID. This
type of jurisdiction would protect Israel from direct claims from
Palestinians, since Palestine is not a member of ICSID, and
since claims can only be brought by nationals of a contracting
state. Additionally, by submitting to dispute resolution only
claims with private parties, Israel is not reducing its sover-
eignty with regard to other states. Furthermore, although this
type of arrangement may undermine several of Israel's policies
as infringing on the ability to do business, it is unlikely to
limit Israel's ability to respond in times of crisis, as mentioned
160. See Vienna Convention, supra note 145, art. 73 (The provisions of the
Vienna Convention "shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a
treaty from a succession of States or from the international responsibility of a
State or from the outbreak of hostilities between States").
161. Weiss, supra note 146, at 141.
162. As Henry Kissinger said, "Israel cannot commit suicide for the sake of
clauses in an agreement." Kissinger Sends Message to Nobel Prize Winners, XINHAU
NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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previously. Thus, since it is universally recognized that a coun-
try can act to protect its security,1" Israel needs to reduce for-
eign investors' fears of losing the benefits guaranteed under
the new Palestinian Investment Law in the event that Israel
would need to take over the territories. It is essential for Israel
to guarantee that any contract a foreign investor enters into
with the PA would be honored by Israel.
Israel has two options with regard to ICSID. First, it can
agree to submit all investment disputes under the Interim
Agreement to the already established ICSID arbitration mech-
anism. Or, second, it can establish its own ICSID-type arbitra-
tion in a mutually agreed-upon location with Palestine, thereby
making the whole dispute resolution more local. The second
option is preferable because it would be a more visible sign
that Israel is willing to subject itself to binding arbitration to
further economic success in the territories. This type of juris-
diction would not only reduce the risk of foreign investment in
Palestine, but may also motivate the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC) and other political insurance provid-
ers, to cover the border closings as a political risk. Currently, a
foreign investor cannot receive any damages as a result of an
Israeli border closing, but if an ICSID-type jurisdiction existed,
Israel may have to pay damages if it continues this practice.
Since under OPIC, and other similar insurance, an insured
must first exhaust local remedies, and in this scenario an in-
sured would have a possible remedy, OPIC, therefore, would be
more inclined to include border closings in its insurance policy.
The next step on behalf of Israel would be to expand the
limited jurisdiction to include the Palestinian private investors.
This expansion is more difficult because it would result in a
political challenge from the private sector. For example, a
Palestinian private investor would most likely challenge the
economic obstacles brought about by the border closures. This
in essence is a policy challenge and, because it is made by a
Palestinian, would likely bring up the issues of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. However, Israel could maintain discretion
over the types of disputes which can be brought before the
panel, or have the ability to provide compensation if it wishes
to continue a policy.
163. See Vienna Convention, supra note 145, art. 73.
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The above suggestions have been limited to investment
disputes and an ICSID-type jurisdiction. The following sugges-
tions will incorporate the discussion in the previous sections of
NAFTA, the GATT, and the EU's ECJ, in that order. A propos-
al fashioned after NAFTA will be discussed first because
NAFTA has a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism
which has been arrived at with a minimal decrease in sover-
eignty. Following the NAFTA model is the GATT model, which
provides for stronger enforcement, and consequently requires
the parties to reduce their sovereignty to a greater degree.
Finally, the ECJ will be discussed as a possible aspirational
model for the formation of a bilateral judiciary, and eventually
a Middle Eastern court system.
A possible starting point for a comprehensive dispute mod-
el is one fashioned after NAFTA, where jurisdiction would
encompass disputes between the PA and the Israeli govern-
ment. Those disputes would be settled by arbitrators rather
than a formal dispute settlement body. This arbitration model
seems more likely to be adopted as an initial measure since
Israel has already agreed to consider arbitration in the Interim
Agreement's Article 21(3). As Article 21(3) provides, "[t]he
Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to
the interim period, which cannot be settled through concilia-
tion.""64 Consequently, Israel could modify the language to
read that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.
Initially this model could be limited to conflicts which may
be in violation of the Interim Agreement's Economic Protocol.
However, regardless of how limited the original jurisdiction is,
Israel should agree to a procedural time frame, such as the
NAFTA time frame discussed in Part II.B. Further, this proce-
dure would include the panel selection process, which under
NAFTA is limited to each party choosing two citizens from the
opposing party's list of nominees, and agreeing on the panel's
chairman." Additionally, it is important that the identity of
those panel members siding with a majority, or a minority,
decision be kept confidential. This will make it more difficult
for a party to complain that a majority of the panel merely
voted according to national interests.
164. Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
165. See NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2011(1), 32 I.L.M. 696.
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Moreover, a structure similar to NAFTA would mean that
the enforcement of the dispute is left to the parties, Israel
would be subjecting itself to a self-monitoring system, rather
than a situation involving a third party. Because this model
calls for self-monitoring, it must include such NAFTA remedies
as compensation and suspension of benefits of equivalent ef-
fect.10
Currently, the suspension of benefits may hurt Palestine
more than Israel, since it is the weaker economy. However, as
the Palestinian economy grows and Israel increases its trade
with Palestine, Israel would have more to lose by non-compli-
ance. Moreover, as Gary Horlick noted, the acceptance of trade
sanctions is:
not giving up your sovereignty; ... [but] in effect saying "I
can reject what this international process decides, if I am
willing to pay a price in trade sanctions by retaliation
against my own goods." So the acceptance of trade sanctions
is a maintenance of sovereignty, it is "I am willing to pay a
price to stay sovereign."'"
Also, just as it is in the United States' interest to have a
prosperous Mexico as its neighbor, it is in Israel's best interest
to create a prosperous Palestine, which would be a market for
Israeli products. Additionally, as the Palestinian economy
grows, Israel's interest in its own investments would be pro-
tected by an already established dispute settlement mecha-
nism.
A further step that could be taken by Israel is submission
to a GATT-type DSB. This DSB could be empowered with
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the entire Interim
Agreement. Thus, it could respond to such questions as: wheth-
er an Israeli security policy that is effecting trade is in viola-
tion of the security provisions of the Interim Agreement, as
well as a barrier to full implementation of the Economic Proto-
col. It could also enable Israel to submit several claims of Pal-
estinian violations which have decreased Israel's faith in the
Palestinian commitment to the Interim Agreement. For exam-
ple, Israel may argue that the following violations are a mate-
166. See id. arts. 2018(2), 2019(1), 32 I.L.M. 697.
167. Horlick, supra note 73, at 60.
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rial breach of the Interim Agreement under the principle pacta
sunt servanda, espoused in Article 26 of the Vienna Conven-
tion:" "failure to amend the PLO's Charter; failure to act to
prevent violence against Israelis; arming of nonauthorized
forces; failure to enforce prohibitions against unauthorized
possession of weapons; failure to refrain from hostile propagan-
da against Israel; and unilateral enactment of legislation with-
in the autonomous regions."'69 Israel could then argue that it
is not in violation of the Economic Protocol since its primary
concern, and threshold level of self-defense, has not been met.
If Israel receives a decision that orders Palestine to make the
above changes, the hostilities of the Palestinian people would
be transferred from Israel to the DSB, which would ultimately
reduce the existing tensions. Conversely, if Israel is required to
comply with an order, such as to find alternatives to border
closures, it would not reflect adversely on the current govern-
ment.
The enforcement mechanism of this DSB panel would be
similar to GATT's DSB and, thus, would enable the parties to:
first, comply with the decision; second, to voluntarily enter into
a compensation agreement; or third, to request a suspension of
concessions. However, as mentioned previously, compensation
agreements are voluntary and therefore may not be imple-
mented. Moreover, the current effect of a Palestinian suspen-
sion of concession on Israel would be minimal. For example, in
the case of the border closures, Israel has adapted to its own
closures by replacing the Palestinian labor force with recent
Russian immigrants. Furthermore, trade sanctions against
Israel would hurt the Palestinian businesses which rely on
exports to Israel. Thus, this more expanded jurisdiction should
be implemented at a stage when Israel has increased its in-
vestment in Palestine. At that stage, a GATT-type surveillance
mechanism will be in the best interests of both partiesY°
Finally, the identity of the panelists is a crucial element
when considering the formation of the DSB panel. Since this
168. See Vienna Convention, supra note 145, art. 26 (agreeing that "[elvery
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith").
169. Weiss, supra note 146, at 136.
170. This Note assumes that Israel will be increasing its investment in Pales-
tine as part of its commitment to greater economic reciprocity, as set forth in the
Economic Protocol, supra note 14, Preamble.
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DSB would be making decisions concerning the entire Interim
Agreement and possibly survey the losing party's compliance,
the presence of a neutral third party will be extremely impor-
tant. Without a neutral third party the panel may be dead-
locked on crucial issues. This is particularly important since if
there was a majority of either country on the panel, the results
may be attributed to the national interests of the panelists,
thereby providing the losing party with an argument that the
decision should not be binding. Even if the decision would be
arrived at in secrecy, like in NAFTA, the losing party could
easily assume that it lost because it lacked the vote of the
opposing country's representative. Thus, to avoid these suspi-
cions there needs to be a neutral third party, meaning a non-
citizen of Israel or Palestine.
The idea of a neutral third party is not foreign to Israel in
the context of solving local disputes. Israel has already agreed
to the involvement of a neutral third party under the Treaty of
Peace with Egypt.' Under that treaty, during a boundary
dispute which the parties agreed to arbitrate,' one panelist
was a national of Israel, another was a national of Egypt, and
three panelists were nationals of other countries. The involve-
ment of foreigners helped achieve the neutrality needed in the
panel and increased the probability of compliance. In fact, Isra-
el, the losing party, did comply with the panel's decision even
though it was strongly opposed to the results.
Another element that may increase compliance with panel
decisions, either under the NAFTA or GATT models, is for the
panel to issue an interim report, giving the parties a chance to
express their views and objections. This interim opportunity
has been found to decrease the parties' reluctance to comply,
and is the reason why both NAFTA and GATT adopted these
measures.
The final model for consideration is that of the ECJ. The
establishment of a bilateral court system would be a very
strong message that Israel views this process as a long-term
solution. This Israeli-Palestinian court could'start with respon-
sibility over selected parts of the Interim Agreement as men-
171. Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of
Israel, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Isr., 18 I.L.M. 362.
172. See Agreement to Arbitrate the Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba
Beachfront, Sept. 11, 1986, Egypt-Isr., 26 I.L.M. 1.
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tioned above. The establishment of a judicial mechanism would
initiate an interpretation of the law as it applies to the special
circumstances of the area. This court's jurisdiction could ex-
pand proportionately to Israel's reduction of sovereignty and
could ultimately reach such broad jurisdiction as granting
individuals a cause of action, as was accomplished within the
context of the ECJ's holding in the Francovich & Bonifaci
case.
173
The most far reaching goal would be for the region to form
a Middle Eastern Court of Justice, modeled after the ECJ,
which would establish its own Middle Eastern legal process.
This step would be a recognition by the Middle Eastern coun-
tries that the security benefits of forming a union outweigh the
losses associated with the decrease of sovereignty. Although
these goals seem difficult to accomplish in view of the current
hostilities, they are possible if incremental steps are followed.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note recognizes the immense historical obstacles that
are facing the Israelis and Palestinians in their goal of achiev-
ing peace. Nevertheless, whether Israel sees the Interim
Agreement as a process creating an autonomous region, or
whether Israel is resigned to full Palestinian sovereignty over
the West Bank and Gaza, the importance of a peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes is unquestionable. Because this conflict is so
deeply rooted, and forged over many centuries, it is unlikely
that long-term solutions could happen with great strides. Rath-
er, it is better to have a plan which will gradually evolve in
stages. As was discussed above, the rational progression of this
body's jurisdiction should be from limited jurisdiction over
investment disputes, to disputes over the Interim Agreement's
Economic Protocol, and eventually to disputes over the entire
Interim Agreement. Ultimately, the jurisdiction could expand
to include disputes arising under an Israeli-Palestinian final
accord. If the parties commence final status negotiations before
implementation of the Interim Agreement, as was recently
proposed by the Netanyahu government,' 4 they must include
a dispute settlement mechanism in order for the final accord to
173. See Reichenberg, supra note 62, at 70-71.
174. See Schmemann, supra note 16, at A6.
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be successful. This Note submits that the same gradual in-
crease in the DSB's jurisdiction, as was recommended for the
Interim Agreement, would be appropriate for a final peace
accord. However, unless these two adversaries learn to settle
their disputes through peaceful resolution, they are destined to
resort to the form of resolution which has been utilized: vio-
lence.
This Note, which has made a comparative analysis of other
multilateral agreements and their dispute resolution mecha-
nism, is not solely to motivate Israel to enter into a binding
dispute resolution, but also to highlight the importance of
regional agreements. Although the proposal of a regional trade
agreement is beyond the scope of this Note, it is a union Israel
should strive to help organize. The formation of the EU illus-
trates the conceptual shift from resorting to punishment and
retribution, as was the model during the Versailles Peace Ac-
cord, to embracing cooperation and economic integration in
order to maintain security and stability. Therefore, an econom-
ically interdependent regional agreement could serve to bind
the Middle East out of a desire to reduce the high regional
security concerns. 75 Further, an effective dispute settlement
mechanism is not only an essential step for the Interim Agree-
ment, but also an essential factor in improving needed regional
peace and eventually effectuating a system of Middle Eastern
unity.
Jasmine Jordaan
175. As one commentator noted:
[Blilateral deals on borders, security cooperation and the non-use of force
are the most practical legal documents. They achieve European reunifica-
tion. They settle border disputes. They neutralize potential military
threats. They are not held hostage to the consensus or participation of a
multitude of governments. But in the end, the bilateral agreements are
band-aids. They are not the stuff of collective security.
Symposium, International Law and Collective Security: Excerpts From the 1991
Friedmann Conference, 29 COLUlM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 536 (1991).
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